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ABSTRACT 
Objective 
To describe incidents of retained surgical items, including their characteristics and the circumstances 
in which they occur.  
Design 
A qualitative content analysis of root cause analysis investigation reports. 
Setting  
Public health services in Victoria, Australia, 2010 – 2015. 
Participants 
Incidents of retained surgical items as described by 31 root cause analysis investigation reports. 
Main Outcome Measures 
The type of retained surgical item, the length of time between the item being retained and detected, 
and qualitative descriptors of the contributing factors and the circumstances in which the retained 
surgical items occurred.  
Results 
Surgical packs, drain tubes and vascular devices comprised 68% (21/31) of the retained surgical 
items. Nearly one-quarter of the retained surgical items were detected either immediately in the 
post-operative period or on the day of the procedure. However, about one-sixth (5/31) were only 
detected after six months, with the longest period being 18 months. Contributing factors included: 
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complex or multi-stage surgery; the use of packs not specific to the purpose of the surgery; and 
design features of the surgical items.  
Conclusion 
Retained drains occurred in the post-operative phase where surgical counts are not applicable, and 
clinician situational awareness may not be as great. Root cause analysis investigation reports can be 
a valuable means of characterising infrequently occurring adverse events such as retained surgical 
items. They may detect incidents that are not detected by other data collections, and can inform the 
design enhancements and development of technologies to reduce the impact of retained surgical 
items.  




The operating room is a complex environment where technology, team dynamics and technically 
difficult operations create a high potential for harm to patients (adverse events).(1) One such type of 
adverse event is a retained surgical item (RSI) which is any material object related to an operative or 
invasive procedure that is unintentionally left inside a patient.(2) The Joint Commission identified 
RSIs resulting in death or permanent loss of function as the most frequently reported sentinel events 
(“any unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury or risk”),(3) 
surpassing wrong patient, wrong site, and/or wrong procedure events.(4, 5) RSIs have been reported 
to occur at a rate of 0.3 per 1,000 abdominal operations, and approximately 1 in 10,000 of all 
inpatient operations.(6) No surgical specialty or procedure is immune from the problem.(1)  
RSIs can be associated with significant harm to patients including: readmission (59%); second surgery 
to remove the RSI (69%); sepsis or infection (50%); fistula or small bowel obstruction (15%); and 
visceral perforation (7%).(7) About half of RSIs are discovered prior to discharge with some RSIs not 
discovered until many months or even years later.(8) Given the harm associated with RSIs, their 
prevention has been identified by the Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN), the 
American College of Surgeons, and The Joint Commission as a US national patient safety priority.(4) 
A systematic review of RSIs (to 2014), identified a large number of contributing factors.(6) These 
include factors associated with: the case or patient, such as emergency or gynaecological 
procedures, unexpected intraoperative events, long procedure durations, and a large patient body 
mass; staff, such as poor communication between staff including failure to communicate suspicions 
and incompletely documented, non-standardised or incorrect counts; and policies, such as unclear 
criteria for obtaining post-operative radiographs.(6)  
The authors of the systematic review suggested that aggregating the findings of root cause analysis 
(RCA) investigations will assist in determining the relative importance of these contributing 
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factors.(6) RCAs are commonly used in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of adverse events by 
undertaking a review of care, to find out what went wrong and why.(9) Despite their limitations,(9-
14) due to their structured exploration and depth of qualitative data, aggregating RCAs can be a 
valuable source of information to characterise infrequently occurring adverse events such as RSIs.  
The results of an individual RCA related to a RSI was published prior to the systematic review.(15) 
This found that the main contributing factors were not performing the standard protocol of counting 
sponges before, as well as after, the procedure.(15) An aggregated review of 308 RSIs from the US 
published in 2018 found contributing factors related to human factors including fatigue and 
distraction, disruptive and unacceptable behaviours, inadequate or non-compliance with policies 
and procedures, and communication between staff.(6)  
There are methodological challenges that impede the analysis of these rare but potentially 
devastating events, however, RCAs are well suited to address these challenges.(6) The aim of this 
paper is to describe RSIs and their characteristics and circumstances in an Australian public health 
system, using RCA reports as the data source.  
METHODS 
Data source 
The origins of the RCAs were sentinel events. These are adverse events that infrequently occur in 
health services and “commonly reflect hospital system and process deficiencies”.(16) In Australia 
there are eight nationally agreed sentinel events,(16) one of which is RSIs. In Victoria, an Australian 
state, public health services report sentinel events occurring in their facilities to the Department of 




The Victorian DHHS provided our research group with 227 RCA de-identified paper-based reports 
from sentinel events that occurred between the years 2010 to 2015 in 48 health services. Of these, 
31 reports related to RSIs and form the basis of the analysis presented in this paper. The 31 RSI 
reports were between 4 and 16 pages in length. The Victorian DHHS also provided the researchers 
with de-identified demographic information relating to the RCA reports including hospital codes, 
region and patient age.  
Analysis 
Due to the low number and wide variety of types of RSIs in this study, medical specialties, and 
anatomical locations,(8) a pre-defined patient safety classification framework was not used to 
extract and classify information from the RCA reports. Instead, a qualitative content analysis was 
undertaken,(17) which allows both deductive and inductive analytic approaches to be incorporated. 
For this analysis, we followed the items in the Standards for Reporting Qualitative Research: A 
Synthesis of Recommendations.(18) 
Two researchers (PH, AD) undertook the analysis. Both researchers have over 15 years experience in 
analysing patient safety data sources including incident reports, coroner’s reports, RCA reports and 
medico-legal claims. They read the 31 reports and classified them according to the type of RSI, and 
the time to detection. Each reviewer developed a list of type of RSIs iteratively and independently, 
compared their findings, and then developed a consensus list. The researcher then undertook a 
separate analysis for each type of RSI by re-reading the RCA reports and analysing them as a group. 
The researchers iteratively extracted themes or concepts from the text of the RCA reports related to 
the circumstances, types of surgery, contributing factors, and methods of detection.(19)  
Ethics 




There were 20 health services who provided the 31 RCA reports with a range of 1-5 RCA reports per 
health service. There were 23 RSI incidents which occurred in health services in metropolitan areas, 
five in regional, and three in rural areas. The genders of the patients involved in the incidents were 
17 males, 12 female and two unknown.  
Of the 31 RCA reports related to RSIs, surgical packs, drain tubes and vascular devices comprised 
68% (21/31) (Table 1). Because of the low numbers of incidents and their heterogeneity in types of 
devices involved, only those relating to surgical packs and drain tubes are presented thematically 
below in the results with summaries of some other incidents outlined.  
Nearly one-quarter of the RSIs were detected either immediately in the post-operative period or on 
the day of the procedure (Table 2). However, about one-sixth (5/31) were detected after six months, 
with the longest period being 18 months. In all cases, except one involving a central venous catheter 
(CVC) guidewire, patients were subjected to a further procedure.  
Surgical packs 
The procedures associated with the nine retained surgical packs were two total hip replacements, 
two below knee femoral popliteal bypasses, an open hemicolectomy, a total laryngectomy, a 
laparotomy, an emergency caesarean section, and an episiotomy. The post-operative surgical counts 
were discrepant in five of the nine cases. X-rays detected two of these, but image intensifiers (II) did 
not detect the other three cases.  
For one incident related to lack of detection by the II, as the images were not kept, the explanations 
for why the II did not detect the pack were speculative: poor image quality associated with 
inadequate software; the required anatomical area was scanned incompletely; and inadequate 
interpretation. In this incident, the fact that the surgical count was discrepant was then “lost” over 
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time in the patient’s medical record and was not mentioned in the discharge summary. Therefore, a 
retained surgical pack was not considered as a possible explanation when the patient subsequently 
presented with symptoms of abdominal pain and was admitted to the same hospital. In the second 
SE where the II did not detect the surgical pack, the radiologist mis-interpreted an x-ray as the 
surgical pack was assumed to be external to the wound. In this case, the presence of pain and 
dysfunction during the admission and videofluoroscopic images subsequently detected the pack. In 
the third RSI where the II did not detect the surgical pack, the surgical pack was sandwiched 
between two components of the total hip joint prosthesis and was not visible on the view obtained. 
Other themes or contributing factors related to surgical pack retention included: 
• complex or multi-stage surgery using a large numbers of packs (>20) can lead to mis-counts or 
confusion (two cases). Multiple surgical teams can lead to inconsistency in how counts are 
conducted when large numbers of surgical packs are used;  
• the use of packs that is not specific to the purpose of the surgery, in one case, abdominal 
packs were used for obstetrics surgery; and 
• the surgical wound being closed prior to the surgical counts being performed, and then 
additional packs being used after the count. Although not stated in the RCA report, the safe 
surgical checklist(20) was deemed unlikely to have been used. 
Drain tubes 
Two of the retained eight drain tube incidents were nearly identical. They both involved patients 
having abdomino-perineal resections of rectal cancer with a Penrose Drain. These both slipped 
undetected into the patient’s bodies. One of these was not detected for three months and was 
presumed to have fallen out. The mechanism of both RSIs was that a safety pin was not used to 
secure the drain in the perianal area for comfort reasons. Both RCA investigations teams recognised 
the need to develop a safe and comfortable method of securing tubes for these patients. A third 
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incident involved an unsecured Penrose Drain related to a hip arthrotomy. The role of radiology was 
highlighted in this incident, where a radiologist noted a possible retained tube in multiple X-ray 
reports, however these potentially abnormal findings were not highlighted. A surgeon who viewed 
the X-rays did not read the reports. This drain was in situ for 16 months.  
There were two RSIs involving Yeates Drains. These comprise of multiple lumens that can be broken 
off. In one RSI, the lumens inadvertently separated. There was no standardised documentation that 
stated the number of Yeates Drains lumens being used. In the other, a registrar was left 
unsupervised to complete a surgical procedure without being familiar with the process for securing 
the drain. There was also no information on the drain packaging stating that it required fixation.  
Another two drain incidents may have been detected earlier, although not prevented, by having the 
lengths inserted marked on the drains: 
• A drain tube being inadvertently sutured to rectus femoris fascia; when the drain was being 
removed it broke and it was not recognised that the whole drain had not come out;  
• Needlestick damage to a drain tube at time of insertion caused it to fracture, but staff did not 
recognise that part of the tube was missing. 
The final drain incident involved use of a type of drain tube that staff were unfamiliar with i.e. a low 
suction drain tube which is slightly thicker than the more familiar non-suction drain tubes.  
Other item and incident types 
Examples of other item and incident types include: 
• Weck vascular clips: the count record showed only the number of cartridges, not the number 
of individual clips. These clips are generally used as permanent clips, however in this case they 
were used as temporary, which is potentially confusing for staff. The white board, which was 
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used for displaying pertinent information on the surgical case at hand, was not visible to the 
scrub nurse and therefore did not provide a reminder to remove the clips.  
• Temporary aneurysm clip: there was no requirement for this clip to be included in the surgical 
count. Therefore, monitoring was reliant on the tracking of the Time-On and Time-Off of each 
clip, which was not recorded nor verbalised.  
• A “Fish” closure device was not included in the count, nor were artery forceps attached to the 
tail of the device when it was inserted, which meant that it was not visible.  
• A microvascular clamp was retained with the main contributing factors identified as a long 
theatre time - ten hours with two teams (i.e., orthopaedics and plastics) and three separate 
counts for different components of the operation. This was compounded by short staffing 
with seven scrub nurses on personal leave, and confusing handovers between scouts. 
• In two of the three CVC line incidents, retrospective review of X-rays revealed the presence of 
CVC lines, however they were not noted in the radiologists’ reports.  
• A piece of plastic was used to cover a hernia repair mesh when it was being inserted. This 
plastic was not included in the count as it was a technique only used by one surgeon and staff 
were unaware of its purpose.  
• A multiple site procedure but only one count done; and then the lack of availability of a rectal 
probe resulting in an additional curette being used as a rectal probe with subsequent count 
failure. 
Other broad findings and contributing factors 
Surgical checklist: Although not stated in the relevant RCA reports, it was unclear whether the “Sign 
Out” section of the Surgical Checklist was completed. This section contains a question “Instrument, 
Sponge and Needle counts are correct (or not applicable)”. As the checklist is meant to be a 
mechanism for common understanding across staff, its use may have led to detection of the 
retained packs.  
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Standardisation where possible: in a small number of cases, it was noted that a contributing factor 
was non-standardisation, for example, different types of drain being stocked or use of a surgical 
technique by one surgeon only. This meant that staff were less likely to know how to use the device 
appropriately or to have appropriate counting templates.  
Communication: there were numerous occasions where inadequate communication between 
surgical team members was a contributing factor, particularly when the surgical procedure involved 
an unusual or unplanned step.  
DISCUSSION 
Principal findings 
We analysed 31 RCA investigation reports related to RSIs from an Australian State health system. 
About two-thirds of these involved surgical packs, drains, and vascular devices including one-quarter 
(8/31) involving post-surgical management of drains. A significant contribution of the study is to re-
emphasize the potential risk not just of items used during surgery, but also in the post-surgical 
period, such as drains. Nearly 20% of the RSIs were not detected for over six months. Contributing 
factors to these incidents occurring or not being detected in a timely manner include design of the 
operating theatre such as whiteboard positioning and surgical devices, documentation of devices 
used, standardisation of devices and techniques, counts not including all devices, communication 
and complex surgery.  
Surgical counts, human factors and situational awareness 
For surgical packs and instruments, counts are an important preventive measure. An incorrect count 
means that the chance of a RSI are at least 20 times greater.(1) However, the counting process is an 
inexact and error prone process.(21-23) Multiple studies have shown that count discrepancies are 
not fully protective, with one study showing that counts only detected 77% of RSIs.(24) The AORN 
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guidelines emphasise that distractions, noise, and interruptions during counts should be 
minimised.(25) Our study found that there are some examples of devices, such as temporary 
aneurysm clips, which are not ordinarily included in the count. We also found, in line with other 
studies, that complex or lengthy procedures were more likely to lead to RSIs.(1, 26, 27) Another 
study found that intraoperative process omissions or systems errors were also associated with 
RSIs.(28) Given these human factors, the importance of team briefings, handovers and the proper 
team-based completion of the surgical checklist are critical to maximise communication and 
situational awareness.(22, 29, 30) 
Can technology improve RSI detection? 
Technological ways to improve RSI detection and to supplement counts include radiofrequency 
labelling on surgical packs, product numbering or tagging, and magnetised products to supplement 
item counts.(31, 32) A review in 2017 found that radio frequency labelling technology could detect 
RSIs with high accuracy rates, reducing the risk of counting errors and improving workflow, but the 
evidence base was limited.(31) Given the infrequency of RSIs, evaluation of these technologies will 
be challenging and to be affordable may need to focus on the usability of the technologies, 
measuring process indicators such as surgical counting errors, rather than outcomes.(6)  
Retained drains and the role of design changes 
One of the main findings of the study and contributions to the literature was that a quarter of the 
sample involved retained drains. This is not too dissimilar to a review of RSI Sentinel Events from the 
US which found approximately one-sixth involved drains or catheters.(8) These RSIs occurred in the 
post-operative phase where surgical counts are not applicable and clinician situational awareness 
may not be as great. Contributing factors included poor design and documentation, and lack of 
knowledge of how best to manage them. Design factors included lack of safe and comfortable 
mechanisms of securing Penrose drains and a lack of lengths marked on drain tubes. There were also 
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documentation issues with Yeates drains, related to the number of lumens and their fixation 
requirements. Changing the design of these drains (or other surgical items) or their accompanying 
documentation are likely to be more effective types of recommendations rather than exhorting staff 
to be more careful.  
However, these types of design changes require gaining agreement and support from external 
manufacturers or suppliers. Agreement on and support for such changes may not be likely given that 
RCAs are generally undertaken at health service level, and are often constrained by their rules and 
norms that their recommendations should pertain only to their own health service which may 
mitigate against design solutions being proposed.(33) The two highly similar Penrose drain RSI 
incidents in this study illustrate the value of the potential role of Departments of Health in 
identifying similar serious adverse events occurring at different health services, communicating 
these to the health services, and developing system-wide recommendations aimed at their 
prevention.(33, 34) Departments of Health, with their large market share, are more likely than 
individual health services to be successful in requesting changes from manufacturers or suppliers.  
Using a checklist for investigations 
Given that “Retained Materials” are “Sentinel Events” in Australia and “Never Events” in other 
jurisdictions such as the US and UK,(35, 36) a detailed investigation such as an RCA is generally 
mandated. However, from our study and others,(1, 6, 8) there are common features that could be 
combined into an investigation template checklist (Box 1). The benefits of such a checklist are to 
collect the information more efficiently and to promote solutions that are more focussed on the 
design features of surgical items and less likely to focus on errors on the frontline.   




• What was the type of retained surgical item? 
• What was the surgical procedure involved? 
• How long post surgery or procedure was the retained surgical item detected? 
• How was the retained surgical item detected? (for example, staff immediately post-operatively, 
routine investigation, patient symptoms followed by clinical investigations) 
• Were there any design features of the retained surgical item that increased the likelihood of the 
material either being retained or not detected? 
• Was the surgery complex, long or did it involve multiple teams? 
• Were distraction or fatigue contributing factors? 
• What was the role of communication, including whether staff felt comfortable speaking up? 
• Was the post-surgical count right, or wrong, or not applicable? 
• If the count was incorrect, what were the types of actions taken after the count? 
• If applicable, was the surgical safety checklist adequately completed? 
 
Strengths and limitations 
Limitations of the study include that, although sentinel event reporting is meant to be mandatory, 
they are generally under-reported. The RCA investigations were often hampered by the time 
between the occurrence of the adverse events and its detection, which was often months later. 
Given this time lapse, staff recall of the relevant surgical procedure may be poor. There were only 31 
incidents in this study meaning that results must be viewed cautiously. Given the disparate nature 
and infrequency of RSIs, analysing low numbers of them is not unusual. For example, Moffatt-Bruce 
et al (2014) states that 52 case reports had been published.(27) On the other hand, a strength is that 
RCAs can provide information on RSIs that may not be detected by other methods. In a study of 30 
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RSIs that were detected using ICD9 codes in one US hospital over a ten-year period, there were none 
involving drains.(37) This is contrast to our study in which one-quarter were drains.  
CONCLUSION 
Although rare, RSIs can cause significant harm to patients. This analysis of 31 reports found that 
surgical packs, drains, and vascular devices make up over two-thirds of RSIs. Contributing factors 
included complex or multi-stage surgery, the use of packs that are not specific to the purpose of the 
surgery, using non-standardised equipment and techniques and sub-optimal design of the items. 
RCA investigation reports can be a valuable means of characterising and understanding infrequently 
occurring adverse events such as RSIs. They may detect adverse events that are not detected by 
other data collections, and can inform the design enhancements and development of technologies 
to reduce the impact of RSIs.  
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Table 1: Types of retained surgical items 
Type of retained material n 
Surgical packs 9 
Drain tubes 8 
Vascular devices 4 
Central venous catheter guide wire 3 
Surgical instrument 1 
Transvaginal tape - plastic sheath 1 
Plastic around a hernia repair mesh 1 
Silicon sheet 1 
Cholangiogram catheter fragment 1 
Cochlear implant stainless steel template 1 
Green gauze 1 
Total 31 
 
Table 2: The length of time between surgical item being retained and detected 
When detected n 
Immediately post-operative 6 
Day of procedure  1 
2 – 8 days 11 
2 weeks - 3 months 8 
>=6 months 5 
Total 31 
 
 
